American Power in Vietnam:

Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, was questioned about his views on American military involvement in Vietnam. He emphasized the need for greater caution and a “more selective exercise” of the U.S.’s “enormous range of weapons.” He also suggested that greater emphasis should be placed on Vietnamese “brains and feet” rather than American military “power and gadgetry.”

Bombing North Vietnam:

When asked about the bombing of North Vietnam, Lee found the question problematic, likening it to asking him whether he’d stopped beating his wife—a question that presupposes guilt. He didn’t agree with the idea that the bombing was either controlled or restrained. Furthermore, he considered bombing to be “one of the minor problems” related to Vietnam.

International Opinion and Diplomacy:

Lee was skeptical about a UN General Assembly call by 47 heads of delegations to unconditionally end American bombing in North Vietnam. His skepticism was rooted in the diversity of those nations and their individual agendas. Lee believed that stopping the bombing wouldn’t necessarily bring North Vietnam to the negotiating table.

Electoral Politics and War:

In a discussion that touched on U.S. electoral politics, Lee dismissed the idea that a Vietnam peace settlement would necessarily lead to an election victory for President Johnson. He underlined the complexity of the situation and how it’s not as straightforward as a “black and white” issue.

Geopolitical Sensitivities in Southeast Asia:

Lee described Southeast Asia as comprising “relatively new and fragile independent nations.” He warned that people in the region have a tendency to align with what appears to be the “winning side” due to historical patterns of shifting allegiances under various forms of occupation. He implied that a wrong outcome in Vietnam could destabilize the region, leading countries to “bend with the wind” towards other emerging powers.

Need for Caution:

Lee concluded by advising caution, not only considering the North Vietnamese but also the potential reactions of the Russians and Chinese. According to him, “there must be a point at which they must react,” emphasizing the need for accurate calculation to avoid unintended consequences in international relations.

Autonomy in Interpretation:

Lee Kuan Yew emphasizes the importance of forming his own views without American influence, pointing out that the U.S. tends to impose its perspective on other nations. He insists on using his own words to express his viewpoints.

Unsolicited American Involvement in Vietnam:

Lee Kuan Yew criticizes the United States for unilateral decisions in Vietnam, from the initial involvement in 1954 to the escalation of military advisors. He notes that Southeast Asian countries were not consulted about these decisions, implying a lack of respect for their autonomy and agency.

Living in the Present:

Lee mentions that what matters now is how to proceed from the present, rather than discussing past American errors in Vietnam. He highlights that other Southeast Asian nations like Thailand are preparing for the repercussions of American actions, adjusting their strategies accordingly.

On South Vietnam’s Self-Help:

When asked about South Vietnam’s efforts in their conflict, Lee declines to pass judgment but suggests that the issue would be better addressed by Vietnam’s own leaders rather than foreign powers like the U.S. He stresses the importance of sincerity and honesty in leadership.

China’s Future and Southeast Asia:

Lee corrects the assumption that he can speak as a Chinese, stating he is a Singaporean of Chinese ethnicity. He warns against underestimating China’s desire for unity and modernization. Lee also dismisses the idea that a unified China would simply invade Southeast Asia. Instead, he argues that the entire region would unify against such an obvious act of aggression.

Subtle Forms of Revolution:

Lee touches on the nuanced ways conflict can arise, beyond straightforward military invasions. He refers to “make-it-yourself” revolutions and “wars of national liberation,” hinting at the complex challenges Southeast Asia faces, which may not necessarily come from conventional military threats.

Importance of Time in South Vietnam:

Lee Kuan Yew emphasizes the critical role that American involvement in South Vietnam plays for Southeast Asia. He urges individual governments in the region to make the most of the “time” this provides, not just for Southeast Asia but also for America’s self-interests.

Role of Demonstrations in Singapore:

When asked about the effects of demonstrations, like the ones in Washington, Lee talks about the spirited nature of Singaporean students. He sees their activism as essential for Singapore’s future. However, he stresses that ultimately, decisions must be made by adults in a manner that would make future generations proud.

American Commitment and Democratic Process:

Lee expresses uncertainty about America’s long-term commitment to Southeast Asia. He is in the U.S. to understand the collective thinking and feelings of the Americans, especially as they pertain to the upcoming presidential elections. He highlights the importance of stamina and perseverance in the American populace for enduring what he calls “a different kind of war.”

Comparing CETO and NATO:

Lee argues that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (CETO) has not been as effective as NATO in rallying collective response. He mentions that the Asians doubt America’s commitment to their region because most Americans have European origins and naturally understand Europe better.

What It Takes for U.S. Involvement:

For America to effectively contribute to Southeast Asian security, Lee says that the American people need to show they genuinely care about Asia. Otherwise, Asian leaders like himself would remain skeptical of American intentions.

Russian and Chinese Reactions:

While Lee doesn’t claim to speak for Russia and China, he believes that at some point, these nations will respond if they feel their national interests are at stake due to the situation in Vietnam.

Singapore’s Independence:

Lee Kuan Yew emphasizes that Singapore is not a client state of the United States and is not seeking aid. He pushes back against the suggestion that Singapore should contribute a “token force” to support U.S. efforts in Vietnam. He argues that it’s not the duty of an elected leader of Singapore to jeopardize his people in potentially disastrous circumstances.

Survival and Long-Term Security:

Lee states that Singapore’s survival is not currently threatened and mentions existing alliances with Britain and the Commonwealth up to the mid-70s. He acknowledges that things could change fundamentally due to U.S. decisions in Vietnam, and Singapore would adjust its plans accordingly.

Treaties and Security Organizations:

When questioned about the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Lee suggests that the focus should be on creating a community in South and Southeast Asia that is economically and socially interdependent. Once that’s established, he envisions a NATO-like security pact that could include multilateral underpinning from global powers like the U.S., Russia, and China.

U.S. Role and Asian Perceptions:

Lee underscores the importance of the U.S. demonstrating that it considers Asia as vital as Europe. He notes that the U.S. must show stamina, perseverance, and patience in its approach to the ongoing conflicts, as the U.S.’s stance will affect its allies and their respective strategies in the region.

Global Cooperation:

Lee concludes by stating that a more peaceful world could be achieved if key global powers could agree not to engage in aggression in South and Southeast Asia, and to respect existing boundaries.

Overall, Lee Kuan Yew addresses Singapore’s autonomous position, long-term security concerns, and hopes for a stable geopolitical environment, heavily influenced by U.S. actions and international cooperation.