Paul Volcker (USA Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve) – Q&A following his speech, “Essential Elements of Financial Reform” (Oct 2013)


Chapters

00:00:07 Volcker Rule and International Implications
00:12:17 Global Coordination for Financial Regulation
00:15:50 Size Limits for Too Big To Fail Banks
00:18:48 Global Liquidity and the Economic Crisis
00:24:26 Global Banking Regulations Impact on Economic Growth
00:29:04 Inflation: A Historical Perspective
00:34:49 Financial Sector Growth and Compensation Discussion

Abstract

Financial Reforms and the Future of Banking: Analyzing the Volcker Rule and Beyond

In a comprehensive assessment of the financial reforms proposed by Paul Volcker and others, this article delves into the complexities of limiting the size of financial institutions, the potential impact of these reforms on economic growth, and the nuances of international financial stability. The article critically examines Volcker’s perspectives, contrasting them with other experts like Goldstein, and explores the implications of regulatory measures like the Volcker Rule, Basel Capital Requirements, and the management of systemic crises. The discussion extends to the global dimension, emphasizing the role of international cooperation and the challenges posed by banks in China, Japan, Korea, and beyond.

Limiting Financial Institution Size

Paul Volcker, a prominent figure in financial reform, addresses the need to limit the size of major financial institutions. Recognizing the systemic risks posed by large banks, Volcker deems an outright breakup of these entities unrealistic. Instead, he focuses on practical solutions, highlighting the importance of preventing further concentration rather than drastic breakups. In this context, Volcker addresses questions about limiting financial institution size both in the United States and abroad, discussing a proposal to restrain the market share of a few large financial institutions to prevent them from becoming systemically important. He argues that institutions with access to 10% of the U.S. market are sufficiently large to sustain themselves, and breaking up big banks to reduce systemic importance is unrealistic.

Potential Offsets and Downsides

Volcker acknowledges the concerns surrounding the elimination of certain commercial bank activities. He asserts that removing activities that pose systemic risks has no downside, advocating for a balance between risk mitigation and maintaining a diverse financial ecosystem, where non-banking institutions can continue engaging in trading and private equity. Regarding potential drawbacks, Volcker acknowledges concerns about potential downsides, such as reduced liquidity or credit availability. He cites research suggesting that excessive liquidity encourages risk-taking and that a balance must be struck to maintain necessary liquidity without fostering overconfidence.

Reconciling Conservative Rules with Failures

Despite the failure of large financial institutions not primarily engaged in the activities targeted by reforms, Volcker stresses the need to regulate proprietary trading due to its inherent risks, citing instances of significant losses caused by rogue traders.

Derivatives and Clearinghouses

Volcker agrees on the risks of non-transparent, customized derivatives. He advocates for moving more derivatives into markets and clearinghouses, coupled with a robust review of clearinghouse strength to ensure resilience against future crises. Volcker agrees with concerns raised about exceptions for customized derivative products that lack transparency and are not cleared through exchanges. He emphasizes the need to strengthen clearinghouses and markets to prevent breakdowns during future crises.

Preventing Risk Transfer from Non-Banks to Banks

Acknowledging that non-banks engaged in proprietary trading will borrow from commercial banks, Volcker emphasizes the role of supervisory and regulatory measures in monitoring such lending practices. Prime brokerage oversight is crucial to prevent banks from over-liberal lending to large traders. Gene Rockberg raises concerns about non-banks borrowing from commercial banks and transferring risk back to them through lending. Volcker responds that supervisors can monitor lending practices through prime brokerage and that regulatory authorities would have more direct leverage over large non-banks. He emphasizes the importance of avoiding conflicts of interest and risks associated with allowing commercial banks to engage in proprietary trading.

International Dimension of the Volcker Rule

Volcker recognizes the global impact of his rule, stressing the importance of international consensus, especially with major financial markets like the UK and Europe, to strengthen the reforms. The upcoming G20 meeting presents a crucial opportunity for achieving this consensus. Volcker emphasizes the importance of international coordination, particularly with the British, to effectively implement and sustain the Volcker proposal. He believes that if the UK and other European countries adopt similar regulations, it would significantly enhance the proposal’s impact. Volcker highlights the need for the President to promote international consistency in this area and others, aiming for commonality and approach at the upcoming G20 meeting in June.

Japanese, Chinese, and Korean Banks

Highlighting the current practices of banks in Japan, China, and Korea, Volcker warns of the potential for these banks to adopt risky practices in the future, underlining the need for preemptive measures.

Transparency and Credit Rating Agencies

The issue of credit rating agency consolidation is addressed, with Volcker supporting the emergence of specialized agencies to foster competition and enhance transparency in credit ratings. Michael Pomeroy raises concerns about the shrinking number of credit rating agencies and their potential collusion, as seen in the Lehman Examiner report. Pomeroy emphasizes the need to address this issue in the proposed reforms, as the small number of agencies may prioritize collective wrongdoing over individual bravery. Volcker acknowledges the problem with credit rating agencies and expresses sympathy for the idea of allowing more specialized agencies to emerge. He suggests exploring the possibility of specialized credit rating agencies that can offer a product beyond charging the issuer, promoting competition and diversity in the market.

MoCA Rule and Perspectives of Goldstein

The MoCA Rule, advocating a ban on proprietary trading for commercial banks, finds support in Volcker’s views. However, Goldstein emphasizes the significance of size limits, proposing a reduction in financial institution balance sheets relative to GDP. The MoCA rule has two elements: a ban on proprietary trading for commercial banks and a size limit vis-a-vis the U.S. market. Volcker is enthusiastic about the ban on proprietary trading but thinks the size limit is reasonable, not enthusiastic. He believes eliminating financial crises for the rest of his life is a more limited but achievable objective. Goldstein argues that the size limit is more important than the ban on proprietary trading. He suggests reducing the size of financial institutions to a level that is more manageable and proportional to the economy’s ability to pay for them. He proposes a 10-year timeframe for institutions to come down to a size limit based on GDP. Volcker expresses disappointment in his own lack of imagination in considering a more drastic breakup of large financial institutions. He acknowledges that preventing further concentration of financial institutions is a practical goal.

Regulation and Crisis Prevention

Volcker expresses skepticism about preventing smaller bank mergers leading to large institutions and underscores the need for public intervention during systemic crises.

International Imbalances and Excess Liquidity

The role of international imbalances and excess liquidity in facilitating the financial crisis is a critical point, with Volcker highlighting its contribution to the crisis’s severity.

Resolution Authority and Emergency Measures

The creation of a Resolution Authority to resolve failing institutions without taxpayer bailouts is supported by Volcker. He also points to the Dodd bill provisions allowing emergency assistance to the market.

Impact of Proposed Reforms on Economic Growth

Volcker confidently asserts that the proposed reforms, particularly the Volcker Rule, will not negatively affect economic growth, as they target specific banking activities not central to banks’ operations.

Basel Capital Requirements

The balance between financial stability and economic growth is scrutinized in the context of stricter capital, liquidity, and leverage restrictions. Political pressures and the risk of inadequate standards are highlighted.

Moderate Inflation and Wage and Price Controls

Volcker strongly opposes the idea of moderate inflation as a solution, emphasizing the importance of price stability. He reflects on historical measures like wage and price controls, advocating against such approaches in the current context.

Executive Compensation and Financial Sector Growth

The cultural shift towards high compensation in the financial industry is acknowledged, with Volcker recognizing the trend’s impact on the sector’s growth and dynamics.

Goldman Sachs, AIG Credit Default Swaps, and Gratitude

The debate over Goldman Sachs’ handling of AIG credit default swaps is explored, with Volcker expressing uncertainty about the appropriate response. The article concludes with recognition of Volcker’s leadership and contributions, underscoring his pivotal role in shaping contemporary financial reforms.


Notes by: BraveBaryon